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Abstract
Many organizations rely on the skills of innovative individuals to create value,
including academic and government institutions, think tanks, and knowledge-
based firms. Roughly speaking, workers in these fields can be divided into two
categories: specialists, who have a deep knowledge of a single area, and gener-
alists, who have knowledge in a wide variety of areas. In this paper, I examine
an individual’s choice to be a specialist or generalist. My model addresses two
questions: first, under what conditions does it make sense for an individual to
acquire skills in multiple areas, and second, are the decisions made by individu-
als optimal from an organizational perspective? I find that when problems are
single-dimensional, and disciplinary boundaries are open, all workers will spe-
cialize. However, when there are barriers to working on problems in other fields,
then there is a tradeoff between the depth of the specialist and the wider scope of
problems the generalist has available. When problems are simple, having a wide
variety of problems makes it is rational to be a generalist. As these problems
become more difficult, though, depth wins out over scope, and workers again
tend to specialize. However, that decision is not necessarily socially optimal–on
a societal level, we would prefer that some workers remain generalists.
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Katharine A. Andersonb,∗
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1. Introduction
Many organizations rely on the skills of innovative individuals to create value.
Examples include academic institutions, government organizations, think tanks,
and knowledge-based firms. Workers in these organizations apply a variety of
skills to in order to solve difficult problems: architects design buildings, bio-
chemists develop new drugs, aeronautical engineers create bigger and better
rockets, software developers create new applications, and industrial designers
create better packaging materials. Their success–and thus the success of the or-
ganizations they work for–is dependent on the particular set of skills that they
have at their disposal, but in most cases, the decision of which skills to acquire
is made by individuals, rather than organizations. The perception is that these
workers choose to become more specialized as the problems they face become
more complex (Strober (2006)) . This perception has generated a countervailing
tide of money and institutional attention focused on promoting interdisciplinary
efforts. However, we have very little real understanding of what drives an indi-
vidual’s decision to specialize.
Roughly speaking, workers in knowledge-based fields can be divided into two
categories: specialists, who have a deep knowledge of a single area, and general-
ists, who have knowledge in a wide variety of areas.1 In this paper, I consider an
∗Corresponding author: +1-(412) 427-1904
Email address: andersok@andrew.cmu.edu (Katharine A. Anderson)
1This dichotomy is often summed up in the literature via a metaphor used by Isaiah Berlin
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individual’s decision to be a specialist or a generalist, looking specifically at two
previously unaddressed questions. First, under what conditions does it make
sense for an individual to acquire skills in multiple areas? And second, are the
decisions made by individuals optimal from an organizational perspective?
Most of the work done on specialists and generalists is focused on the roles
the two play in the economy. Collins (2001) suggests that specialists are more
likely to found successful companies. Lazear (2004 and 2005), on the other
hand, suggests that the successful entrepreneurs should be generalists–a theory
supported by Astebro and Thompson (2011), who show that entrepreneurs tend
to have a wider range of experiences than wage workers. Tetlock (1998) finds
that generalists tend to be better forecasters than specialists. In contrast, a wide
variety of medical studies (see, for example, Hillner et al (2000) and Nallamothu
et al (2006)), show that outcomes tend to be better when patients are seen
by specialists, rather than general practitioners. However, none of this work
considers the decision that individuals make with respect to being a specialist
or generalist. While some people will always become generalists due to personal
taste, the question remains: is it ever rational to do so in the absence of a
preference for interdisciplinarity? And is the decision that the individual makes
optimal from a societal perspective?
There is evidence that being a generalist is costly. Adamic et al (2010) show
that in a wide variety of contexts, including academic research, patents, and
contributions to wikipedia, the contributions of individuals with greater focus
tend to have greater impact, indicating that there is a tradeoff between the
number of fields an individual can master, and her depth of knowledge in each.
This should not be surprising. Each of us has a limited capacity for learning new
things–by focusing on a narrow field of study, specialists are able to concentrate
in an essay on Leo Tolstoy: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big
thing” (Berlin (1953)) In other words, foxes are generalists with a wide variety of tools to
apply to problems (albeit sometimes inexpertly) and hedgehogs are specialists who have a
single tool that they can apply very well.
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their efforts and maximize the use of that limited capacity, while generalists
are forced to spread themselves more thinly in the pursuit of a wider range of
knowledge. In the language of economics, generalists pay a fixed cost for each
new field of study they pursue, in the form of effort expended learning new
jargon, establishing new social contacts in a field, and becoming familiar with
new literatures.
Given that it is costly to diversify ones skills, the decision to become a
generalist can be difficult to rationalize. In this paper, I examine model in which
workers decide whether to be specialists or generalists to explore conditions
under which it is rational for an individual to choose to be a generalist. I
show that when problems are single-dimensional and there are no barriers to
working on problems in other disciplines, the equilibrium population contains
only specialists. However, when there are barriers to working on problems in
other fields (eg: communication barriers or institutional barriers) then there is
a tradeoff between the depth of study of the specialist and the wide scope of
problems that the generalist can work on. When problems are relatively simple,
generalists dominate because their breadth of experience gives them a wider
variety of problems to work on. But as problems become more difficult, depth
wins out over scope, and workers tend to specialize.
I then show that the equilibrium decisions reached by individuals are not
necessarily socially optimal. As problems become harder, individual workers
are more likely to specialize, but as a society, we would prefer that some indi-
viduals remain generalists. This disconnect reflects the fact that from a social
perspective, we would prefer to have researchers apply the widest possible va-
riety of skills to the problems we face, but individuals internalize the cost of
obtaining those skills. Thus, the model predicts that some populations will suf-
fer from an undersupply of generalists. In such populations, it would be socially
beneficial to subsidize the acquisition of skills in broad subject areas.
Finally, I consider an extension of the model in which problems have multiple
parts. This allows me to consider problems that are explicitly multidisciplinary–
that is, when different parts of a problem are best addressed using skills from
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different disciplines. I show when problems are multidisciplinary, it is possible
to rationalize being a generalist, even when there are no disciplinary boundaries.
In particular, when there is a large advantage to applying the best tool for the
job, being a generalist is optimal.
2. Model
I construct a two period model. In period 1, the workers face a distribution
of problems and each worker chooses a set of skills. In period 2, a problem is
drawn from the distribution, and the workers attempt to solve it using the skills
they acquired in period 1. I will solve for the equilibrium choice of skills in
period 1.
Let S be the set of all possible skills.2 The skills are arranged into 2 dis-
ciplines, d1 and d2, each with K skills, s1d...sKd. An example with six skills
arranged into two disciplines is shown in Figure 2.1. A specialist is a person who
chooses skills within a single discipline. A generalist is a person who chooses
some skills from both disciplines.
A problem, y, is a task faced by the workers in the model. A skill is a piece
of knowledge that can be applied to the problem in an attempt to solve it. Each
skill skd ∈ S has either a high probability (H) or a low probability (L) of solving
the problem. I will define a problem by the matrix of probabilities that each
skill will solve the problem. That is, y =

y11 y12
...
...
yK1 yK2
 where ykd = H if
skill k in discipline d has a high probability of solving the problem and L if it
has a low probability of solving the problem. So, for example, if there are two
2Skills are defined as bits of knowledge, tools, and techniques useful for solving problems
and not easily acquired in the short run. See Anderson (2010) for a model with a similar
treatment of skills.
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Discipline 1 
(d1)
s11
s31
s21
Discipline 2 
(d2)
s12
s32
s22
Figure 2.1: Two disciplines, each with three skills.
disciplines, each with three skills, a problem might be
y =

L H
H H
H L

meaning that two of the skills in each discipline have a high probability of solving
the problem, and one skill in each discipline has a low probability of solving the
problem. Define h ≡ 1−H and l ≡ 1− L.
The mechanics of the model are as follows. In period 1, the workers, i1...iN ,
each choose a set of skills Ai ⊂ S. In period 2, the workers attempt to solve
a problem using those skills. I will assume that workers have a capacity for
learning skills, which limits the number of skills they can obtain. In the current
context, I will assume that all workers all have the same capacity for learning
new skills, and that all skills are equally costly to obtain.3 LetM ∈ Z+ represent
an individual’s capacity for new skills and let q = 1 be the cost of acquiring a
3The case where workers have different capacities would obviously be an interesting exten-
sion, as would the case where different skills had different costs.
7
new skill. I assume that workers pay a fixed cost, c, for learning skills in a new
discipline. That is, a worker pays 1 + c to obtain the first skill in a discipline,
and q = 1 for every additional skill in that discipline. For simplicity, I will
assume that M = K + c. This assumption means that a specialist can obtain
all K skills in one discipline, and a generalist can obtain a total of K − c skills
spread over the two disciplines.
Although workers in period 1 do not know the particular problem they will
face in period 2, they do know the distribution, ∆, from which those problems
will be drawn. In particular, they know the probability that each skill will be
an H skill or an L skill. For simplicity, I will make two assumptions about the
distribution of problems: 1) skills are independent, meaning that the probability
that skill skd is an H skill is independent of the probability that skill sk′d′ is an
H skill4 and 2) skills are symmetric within disciplines, meaning that every skill
in a discipline has an equal probability of being an H skill.5
This knowledge of the distribution of problems can be translated into knowl-
edge about individual skills. Let δd be the probability that a skill in discipline
d is an H skill–that is, δd = E [Prob (ykd = H)] where the expectation is taken
over the distribution of problems, ∆. The vector of probabilities in the two
disciplines, δ = [δ1, δ2], is known ex ante.
Workers choose their skills in period 1 to maximize their expected probability
of solving the problem in period 2. A Nash equilibrium of this game is a choice of
skill set for each worker in the population, A = {A1...AN} , such that no worker
has an incentive to unilaterally change her skill set, given the distribution of
problems.
4This assumption means that skills must be applied more or less independently. That is,
it cannot be the case that skills are used in combination to solve problems, or that skills build
on one another.
5This assumption simplifies the decision making process for generalists. When skills are
symmetric within a discipline, a generalist’s skill acquisition decision is simply a division of
her skills across the two disciplines–within a discipline, she can choose her skills at random.
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3. Results: Specialization and Barriers Between Disciplines
In this section, I consider two questions. The first question concerns indi-
vidual decision-making–what is the equilibrium skill acquisition decision of the
workers? Under what conditions do individuals decide to generalize? The sec-
ond question concerns the optimality of that population from an organizational
perspective. Is the equilibrium population optimal?
Note that in order to simplify the exposition, I will consider a special case
where all disciplines are equally useful in expectation–that is, where δ1 = δ2 = δ.
It is straightforward to generalize the results to a case where δ1 6= δ2 (see
Appendix for the details).
3.1. Equilibrium Skill Populations with No Barriers between Disciplines
Given that generalists pay a significant penalty for diversifying their skills,
it is difficult to explain the existence of generalists in the population. Theorem
1 states that if workers can work on any available problem, then there will be
no generalists in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
workers can work on any available problem, then no worker will ever want to be
a generalist and the equilibrium population will contain only specialists.
Proof. The ex ante probability that a specialist in discipline i will be able to
solve a problem from a given distribution, ∆, is
E [P (Si)] =
∑
y
Prob (one of skills solves y) ∗∆ (y)
=
∑
y
(1− Prob (none do)) ∗∆ (y)
= 1−
K∑
ni=0
hni lK−ni
(
K
ni
)
δni (1− δ)K−ni
= 1− (δh+ (1− δ) l)K
where ni is the number of H skills in discipline i in a particular problem, y.
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Now, consider a generalist who is spreading his skills across both disciplines.
The ex ante probability that a generalist with x skills in discipline 1 andK−c−x
skills in discipline 2 will solve a problem from a given distribution, ∆, is
E [P (G)] = 1−
∑
y
Prob (none of skills solve y) ∗∆ (y)
= 1− (δh+ (1− δ) l)K−c
1 − (δh+ (1− δ) l)K > 1 − (δh+ (1− δ) l)K−c, and thus no individual will
ever be a generalist in two disciplines. (See Appendix for the same result with
δ1 6= δ2)
Note that this result generalizes to a case with more than two disciplines.
Generalists do worse as they add skills in additional disciplines, so this result
holds regardless of the number of disciplines a generalist spreads himself across.
3.2. Equilibrium Skill Populations with Barriers between Disciplines
Theorem 1 clearly indicates that when workers can solve problems in other
fields, there is no advantage to being a generalist. However, in practice, there
may be many barriers between disciplines that prevent a worker in one disci-
pline from solving problems in another. Cultural or institutional barriers may
prevent her from working on questions in other disciplines, either because re-
sources are not forthcoming or because it is difficult to get compensated for
work in other areas. Communication barriers are also a significant impediment
to interdisciplinary work–although a software engineers may have skills useful
in solving user interface problems, field-specific jargon may make it difficult for
her to communicate her insights. If communication barriers are severe enough,
she may even have difficulty understanding what open questions exist. Finally,
a person in one field may simply be unaware of problems that exist in other
fields, even if her skills would be useful in solving them.
Barriers to working on problems outside ones discipline give us the ability
to talk about the “scope” of a worker’s inquiry. Generalists are able to work on
a broader set of problems, and thus their scope is larger than that of specialists.
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There is therefore a tradeoff between the depth of skill gained through special-
ization and the scope gained through generalization. A specialist has a depth
of skill that gives her a good chance of solving the limited set of problems in
the area she specializes in. Generalists have a limited number of skills, but are
able to apply those skills to a much broader set of problems. Thus, the choice
between being a specialist and a generalist can be framed in terms of a tradeoff
between the depth of one’s skill set and scope of one’s problem set.
More formally, choice of whether to specialize will depend on two parameters.
First, let pi (δ, h, l) ≡ (δh+ (1− δ) l) be the expected probability that a skill
won’t be able to solve a problem drawn from ∆. When pi is large, the probability
that any one skill will solve the problem is very low. Thus, we can think of
problems becoming more difficult as pi increases. Second, let φ be the fraction
of all problems that occur in discipline 1. When φ is very large or very small,
most of the problems fall in one field or another, limiting the value of increasing
the scope of the problem set.
These two parameters–φ and pi–define a range in which workers will choose
to generalize in equilibrium. This range is illustrated in Figure 3.1. This di-
agram illustrates the tradeoff between depth and scope. When problems are
easy to solve, scope is more valuable than depth. However, as pi increases and
problems become more difficult, depth wins out over scope, and the range in
which individuals choose to generalize shrinks.
Theorem 2 summarizes these results.
Theorem 2. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
there are barriers to working on problems in other disciplines, then workers will
generalize if 1 −
(
1−piK−c
1−piK
)
≤ φ ≤ 1−piK−c
1−piK where φ is the fraction of problems
assigned to discipline 1. If φ > 1−pi
K−c
1−piK , then workers will all specialize in
discipline 1 and if φ < 1−
(
1−piK−c
1−piK
)
then workers will all specialize in discipline
2.
Proof. In this case, the ex ante probability that a problem is solved by a special-
ist is φ
(
1− (δh+ (1− δ) l)K
)
for a specialist in discipline 1 and (1− φ)
(
1− (δh+ (1− δ) l)K
)
11
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
! problems are 
harder
problems are 
easier
ϕ
Generalists
Specialists
Specialists
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium skill acquisition decisions when k = 3 and c = 1.
for a specialist in discipline 2. Since generalists can work on problems in both
disciplines, their expected probability of solving the problem is 1−(δh+ (1− δ) l)K−c.
A worker will generalize if E [P (S1)] < E [P (G)] and E [P (S2)] < E [P (G)].
The result follows immediately. (See Appendix for the same result with δ1 6=
δ2)
Note that the size of the regions in which workers specialize depends on how
costly it is to diversify ones skills. As the fixed cost of learning something in a
new discipline increases (c ↑), the regions in which people specialize grow.
3.3. Optimality of the Equilibrium
In this section, I consider whether this distribution of specialists and gener-
alists in the population is optimal, from a societal perspective. There is reason
to believe that it would not be. From a societal standpoint, we would like to
maximize the probability that someone manages to solve the problem. This
means that as a society, we would prefer to have problem solvers apply as wide
a range of skills as possible. But workers who diversify their skills obtain fewer
12
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Figure 3.2:
skills overall, which tends to make the individual want to specialize. The result
of this disconnect between individual and social welfare is a range in which gen-
eralists are under provided (see Figure 3.2). As problems become more difficult,
this region of suboptimality grows, as is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Theorem 3 summarizes these results.
Theorem 3. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
there are barriers to working on problems in other disciplines, then there is a
range of values for φ (the fraction of problems assigned to discipline 1) such that
generalists are underprovided in the equilibrium population of problem solvers.
In particular, generalists are underprovided when 1−pi
K−c
1−piK < φ <
1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK
or 1− 1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK < φ < 1− 1−pi
K−c
1−piK .
Proof. The probability that at least one of the N problem-solvers in the popu-
lation solves the problem is 1−Prob (none of them do). If all of the individuals
in the population are specialists in discipline 1, then with probability φ, each
specialist has a probability 1 − piK of solving the problem and piK of not solv-
ing it. With probability 1 − φ, the problem is assigned to the other discipline,
and no specialist solves it. Thus, the probability of someone in a population of
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Figure 3.3: Regions of social suboptimality for k = 3, c = 1, N = 10
discipline 1 specialists solving the problem is
Prob (one of N solve it) = 1− Prob (none of N solve it)
= 1− [φProb (none solve problem in d1)
+ (1− φ)Prob (none solve problem in d2)]
= 1−
[
φProb (one fails)N + (1− φ) ∗ 1
]
= 1−
[
φ
(
piK
)N
+ (1− φ) ∗ 1
]
= φ
(
1− piKN)
On the other hand, if they are all generalists, then the probability of at least
one solving the problem is
Prob (one of N solve it) = 1− Prob (none of N solve it)
= 1− (piK−c)N
= 1− piN(K−c)
Society is better off with a population of generalists when 1 − piN(K−c) >
φ
(
1− piKN), which is true when φ < 1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK . However, there is a population
of generalists when φ ≤ 1−piK−c
1−piK . It is always the case that
1−piK−c
1−piK ≤ 1−pi
N(K−c)
1−piNK .
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So if 1−pi
K−c
1−piK < φ <
1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK , then society is better off with a population of
generalists, but has a population of specialists.
We can make a similar argument for specialists in discipline 2. Society is bet-
ter off with a population of generalists when 1− piN(K−c) > (1− φ) (1− piKN),
which is true when φ > 1− 1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK . However, there is a population of general-
ists when φ > 1− 1−piK−c
1−piK . It is always the case that 1− 1−pi
N(K−c)
1−piNK ≤ 1− 1−pi
K−c
1−piK .
So if 1 − 1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK < φ < 1 − 1−pi
K−c
1−piK , then society is better off with a popu-
lation of generalists, but has a population of specialists. (See Appendix for the
same result with δ1 6= δ2)
Note that the size of the regions of suboptimality will depend on the number
of individuals in the population. As N increases, the suboptimal regions become
larger.
4. An Extension: Problems with Multiple Parts
In the previous section, I showed that barriers to addressing problems in
other disciplines can induce problem solvers to diversify their skills. In this sec-
tion, I consider an extension of the previous model, which highlights a second
scenario in which individuals can be incentivized to acquire skills in multiple
disciplines: problems with multiple parts. As problems become increasingly
complicated, they may be broken down into many different sub-problems. Al-
though in some cases, these subproblems may all be best addressed within a
single discipline, in others, different subproblems will be best addressed using
different skills. In this section, I show that when problems aremultidisciplinary–
that is, when different parts of a problem are best addressed using different
disciplines–then a population of generalists can be sustained.
4.1. Problems With Multiple Parts
As in the previous model, skills in the set S are divided into two disciplines,
d1 and d2. Workers use their skills to address a problem, the nature of which is
not known ex ante. They will choose to be a specialist or generalist in period 1
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to maximize their chances of solving the problem in period 2. But now, suppose
each problem consists of two parts, y1 and y2. In order to solve the problem,
an individual must solve all parts of the problem.6 Each part of the problem
is addressed independently by the skills in each of the disciplines. Thus, much
as before, we can define the parts of the problem by a matrix of probabilities
that each skill will solve the problem. That is, yi =

yi11 y
i
12
...
...
yiK1 y
i
K2
 where
yikd = H if skill k in discipline d has a high probability of solving part i and L
if it has a low probability of solving part i.
As in the previous section, I will assume that for each part of the problem,
skills are independent (Prob(yikd = H) uncorrelated with Prob(y
i
k′d′ = H)) and
skills are symmetric within disciplines (Prob(yikd = H) = Prob(y
i
jd = H)) .
As before, the probability that a given skill is an H skill is not known ex
ante. However, the workers know the expected probability that a skill is an H
skill. I will allow the expected probabilities to vary across parts of the problem–
in other words, it is possible that a discipline will be more useful in solving one
of the parts of the problem than in solving the other part of the problem. Let
δid be the probability that a skill from discipline d is an H skill for part i of
the problem. That is, δid = E
[
Prob
(
yikd = H
)]
. The matrix δ =
 δ11 δ21
δ12 δ
2
2

describes a distribution of problems, ∆, and is known ex ante. An entry in the
ith column of that matrix is the vector of probabilities that a skill in each of the
disciplines will be useful for solving part i of the problem.
We can categorize the problems according to the relative usefulness of the
two disciplines in the two parts of the problem. There are two categories for the
problems:
1. One discipline is as or more useful for both parts of the problem: δi1 ≥ δi2∀i
2. One discipline is more useful for part 1 and the other discipline is more
6This is essentially an adaptation of Kremer’s O-ring Theory (Kremer (1993)).
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Category 2: Each discipline useful for a different part
Category 1: One discipline is always as or more useful on all parts
X X
X X
X
X
O
O
X X
O O
X X
X O
Part 1 Part 2
Discipline 1
Discipline 2
X X
X X
X O
O X
O X
X O
O X
O X
O O
O O
X O
O O etc...
Figure 4.1:
useful for part 2: δi1 > δi2 and δ
j
1 < δ
j
2
These categories are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
If a problem falls into the first category, then the results are similar to those
obtained in Section 3. In particular, if there are no barriers to working on
problems in other disciplines, then all workers will specialize. If a problem falls
into the second category, then the results do not resemble any of those already
explored. Problems with multiple parts, each of which is best addressed within
the context of a different discipline, are often referred to as multidisciplinary.
Generalists have an advantage in multidisciplinary problems, because they can
apply different types of skills to different parts of a problem. For example, sup-
pose a scientist is look at nerve conduction in an organism. That problem may
have elements are are best addressed using biological tools, and other elements
that are best addressed using physics tools. An individual with both biology
and physics skills will have an advantage over someone who is forced to use (for
example) physics skills to solve both parts of the problem. The below states
that when problems are multidisciplinary, it can be rational to be a generalist,
even in the absence of barriers to working in other fields.
More formally, suppose that if a worker uses the “right” discipline for a part
of a problem, then there is a probability δ1 that a skill in that discipline is
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useful (δ1 = Prob
(
yikd = H
)
when d is the right discipline to use for part i
of the problem). If she uses the “wrong” discipline, then there is a probability
δ0 that a skill in that discipline is useful (δ1 = Prob
(
yikd = H
)
when d is the
wrong discipline to use for part i of the problem). This is without loss of
generality, because the only thing that makes a problem multidisciplinary is the
ordering of the usefulness of the disciplines. Further, let pi1 = δ1h + (1− δ1) l
and pi0 = δ0h + (1− δ0) l. These represent the probability that a skill in the
right discipline will not solve a part of a problem and the probability that a skill
in the wrong discipline will not solve part of the problem. Note that pi1 < pi0.
When the efficacy of the two disciplines is very different (pi1  pi0), then
using the right skill for the job has a large effect on the probability of solving
the problem as a whole, and it will be rational to obtain skills in multiple
disciplines. Figure 4.2 illustrates the region in which individuals choose to be
generalists and specialists, and Theorem 4 summarizes the result.
Theorem 4. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
problems multidisciplinary (eg: δ =
 δ1 δ0
δ0 δ1
 with δ1 > δ0) then there is a
set of values of pi1 = δ1h + (1− δ1) l and pi0 = δ0h + (1− δ0) l such that it
is individually optimal for workers to be generalists, even when there are no
barriers to solving problems in other fields. In particular, workers will become
generalists when
(
1− pi
K−c
2
1 pi
K−c
2
0
)2
>
(
1− piK1
) (
1− piK0
)
Proof. WLOG, consider the case where δ =
 δ1 δ0
δ0 δ1
 with δ1 > δ0. A spe-
cialist in discipline i will have K skills in discipline i. The expected probability
that her skills will solve both parts of the problem is E [P (success on part 1)] ∗
E [P (success on part 2)], which is
(
1− piK1
) (
1− piK0
)
where pi1 = δ1h+(1− δ1) l
and pi0 = δ0h+ (1− δ0) l.
A generalist will have skills in both disciplines. In this case, it will be optimal
for a generalist to split her skills evenly between the two disciplines, and she
will obtain K−c2 skills in each. The expected probability that she will solve both
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium skill acquisition decisions when problems are multidisciplinary, and
k = 3 and c = 1.
parts of the problem is
(
1− pi
K−c
2
1 pi
K−c
2
0
)2
.
Thus, individuals choose to generalize, when
(
1− pi
K−c
2
1 pi
K−c
2
0
)2
>
(
1− piK1
) (
1− piK0
)
.7 This region, as a function of pi1 and pi0, is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for
K = 3 and c = 1. The boundary of this region is defined by the equation
piK1 + pi
K
0 = (pi1pi0)
K−c
2 − 2 (pi1pi0)K−c + (pi1pi0)K .
As would be expected, the region where individuals specialize shrinks as
the costs to generalizing (c) become smaller, relative to the individual’s total
7Note that when δ1 = δ0, we have a case that fits into the first category in the taxonomy of
problem distributions in Figure 4.1. Since δ1 = δ0 =⇒ pi1 = pi0, we can use this calculation
to verify the claim made above that in the case where skills are symmetric, the results are the
same as in Section 3.
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capacity for learning new skills (M = K + c).
5. Conclusion
Being a generalist is costly. Every new area of expertise comes at consid-
erable fixed cost, in the form of a new literature, new jargon, and new basic
ideas. However, there are clearly a large (and growing) number of individuals in
research communities who choose to do so. This raises the question of whether
that decision is ever individually rational? And is there a reason to believe that
fewer people choose to be generalists than is socially optimal?
This paper suggests that being a generalist can be a rational decision under
particular conditions. In particular, obtaining a broad range of skills is rational
if there are significant barriers to working on questions in fields with which one is
unfamiliar. Those who pay the initial price of learning the jargon and literature
of a new field reap the benefits in the form of a larger pool of problems to solve. It
can also be rational to be a generalist if problems are multidisciplinary–that is, if
different parts of a problem are best addressed using skills in different disciplines.
Moreover, because individuals bear the costs of becoming generalists, we will
tend to have fewer of them than is optimal from a societal standpoint. This
potential market failure means that in some cases, it is optimal for funding
agencies and private organizations to subsidize individuals in their efforts to
diversify their skills and promote interdisciplinary researchers. However, it is
unclear whether our current situation is one in which such funding is required.
More careful consideration of this question is a good candidate for further work.
There are several elements of this model that suggest directions for future
research. It would be interesting to consider a case where individuals differ in
their innate capacity for learning skills. This might provide some insight into
what types of individuals choose to become generalists. Incorporating collab-
oration would be another particularly interesting extension. Collaboration has
always been an important part of problem solving and innovation, and it has
only become more important over time (see, among others, Laband and Tollison
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(2000), Acedo et al (2006), and Goyal et al (2006)). There is reason to believe
that in a collaborative context, the advantage to generalists would be enhanced,
because generalists could connect specialists in different fields.
On a more general level, there is much to be gained from a better understand-
ing of specialization decisions. Research universities, government organizations
such as NASA, and private enterprises ranging from Genentec to Google are
reliant on the skills of individual problem solvers. The decisions these individ-
uals make about the breadth skills they obtain have an undeniable effect on
the rate of innovation. However, we still have only a limited understanding of
the what drives those skill acquisition decisions, and what distinguishes the role
of specialists and generalists in problem solving. Better theoretical models of
these decisions have the potential to greatly enhance our understanding of this
important aspect of such organizations.
References
[1] Acedo, F..J., Barroso, C., Casanueva, C., and Galan, J.L., 2006.
Co-authorship in Management and Organizational Studies: An
Empirical and Network Analysis. Journal of Management Studies
43 (5), 957-983
[2] Adamic, L.A., Wei, X., Yang, J., Gerrish, S., Nam, K.K., and
Clarkson, G.S., 2010. Individual focus and knowledge contribution.
Preprint. arXiv:1002.0561v1
[3] Astebro, T., and Thompson, P., 2011. Entrepreneurs, Jacks of all
trades or Hobos? Research Policy 40 (5), 637-649
[4] Berlin, I., 1953. The Hedgehog and the Fox. Simon and Schuster,
New York.
[5] Collins, J., 2001. Good to Great. HarperCollins, New York.
21
[6] Goyal, S., van der Leij, M. J., and Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L., 2006.
Economics: An Emerging Small World. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 144 (2), 403-412
[7] Hillner, B.E., Smith, T.J., and Desch, C.E., 2000. Hospital and
Physician Volume or Specialization and Outcomes in Cancer Treat-
ment: Importance in Quality of Cancer Care. Journal of Clinical
Oncology 18 (11), 2327-2340
[8] Kremer, M., 1993. The O-ring theory of economic development.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3), 551-575
[9] Laband, D.N., and Tollison, R.D., 2000. Intellectual Collaboration.
Journal of Political Economy 108 (3), 632-662
[10] Lazear, E., 2004. Balanced skills and entrepreneurship. American
Economic Review 94 (2), 208–211.
[11] Lazear, E., 2005. Entrepreneurship. Journal of Labor Economics
23 (4), 649–680.
[12] Nallamothu, B.K, Wang, Y., Magid, D.J., McNamara, R.L., Her-
rin, J., Bradley, E.H., Bates, E.R., Pollack, C.V., and Krumholz,
H.M., 2006. Relation Between Hospital Specialization With Pri-
mary Percutaneous Coronary Intervention and Clinical Outcomes
in ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial Infarction : National Registry
of Myocardial Infarction-4 Analysis. Circulation 113, 222-229
[13] Strober, M.H. 2006. Habits of the Mind: Challenges for Multidis-
ciplinary Engagement. Social Epistemology 20 (3), 315-331
[14] Tetlock, P.E., 1998. Close-Call Counterfactuals and Belief-System
Defenses: I Was Not Almost Wrong But I Was Almost Right.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (3), 639-652
22
Appendix
Theorem 5 is the equivalent of Theorem 1, and states that if individuals can
work on any available problem, then there is no advantage to being a generalist.
Theorem 5. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
workers can work on any available problem, then no worker will ever want to be
a generalist and the equilibrium population will contain only specialists.
Proof. As above, the ex ante probability that a specialist in discipline i will be
able to solve a problem from a given distribution, ∆, is
E [P (Si)] = 1− (δih+ (1− δi) l)K
= 1− piKi
where pii = (δih+ (1− δi) l).
WLOG, suppose δ1 > δ2. Since h < l, this means that pi1 < pi2 and
E [P (S1)] > E [P (S2)]. Thus, to determine whether any individual will gener-
alize, I need to compare E [P (S1)] to E [P (G)].
The ex ante probability that a generalist with x skills in discipline 1, and
K − c− x skills in discipline 2 solves a problem from a given distribution, ∆, is
E [P (G)] = 1− (δ1h+ (1− δ1) l)x (δ2h+ (1− δ2) l)K−c−x
= 1− pix1piK−c−x2
Since pi1 < pi2, E [P (G)] is strictly increasing in x. This means that a
generalist will set x = K− c−1 and E [P (G)] = 1−piK−c−11 pi2, which is clearly
less than E [P (S1)] = 1− piK1 .
Theorem 6 is a generalized version of Theorem 2, and states the parameter
range in which individuals will choose to diversify their skills when there are
barriers to working interdisciplinarily.
Theorem 6. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
there are barriers to working on problems in other disciplines, then there is a
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range of values for φ (the fraction of problems assigned to discipline 1) for which
individuals will generalize.
In particular, the ranges are as follows:
If δ1 = δ2 = δ, workers will obtain K − c skills spread across the two
disciplines when 1 − 1−piK−c
1−piK ≤ φ ≤ 1−pi
K−c
1−piK , K skills in discipline 1 when
φ > 1−pi
K−c
1−piK , and K skills in discipline 2 when φ < 1− 1−pi
K−c
1−piK .
If δ1 > δ2, then workers will obtain K − c − 1 skills in discipline 1 and
one skill in discipline 2 when 1 −
(
1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
)
≤ φ ≤ 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK1
, K skills
in discipline 1 when φ > 1−pi
K−c−1
1 pi2
1−piK1
, and K skills in discipline 2 when φ <
1−
(
1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
)
.
If δ2 > δ1, then workers will obtain K − c − 1 skills in discipline 2 and
one skill in discipline 1 when 1 −
(
1−piK−c−12 pi1
1−piK1
)
≤ φ ≤ 1−piK−c−12 pi1
1−piK1
, K skills
in discipline 1 when φ > 1−pi
K−c−1
2 pi1
1−piK1
, and K skills in discipline 2 when φ <
1−
(
1−piK−c−12 pi1
1−piK2
)
.
Proof. In this case, the ex ante probability that a problem is solved by a spe-
cialist is φ
(
1− piK1
)
for a specialist in discipline 1 and (1− φ) (1− piK2 ) for a
specialist in discipline 2. Since generalists can work on problems in both disci-
plines, their expected probability of solving the problem is 1−pix1piK−c−x2 where
x is the number of skills the generalist chooses to acquire in discipline 1. First,
suppose δ1 > δ2. Since h < l, this means that pi1 < pi2 and E [P (G)] is strictly
increasing in x. Thus, a generalist will choose a minimal number of skills in the
less useful discipline, and E [P (G)] = 1− piK−c−11 pi2.
An individual will generalize if E [P (S1)] < E [P (G)] and E [P (S2)] <
E [P (G)]. Setting φ
(
1− piK1
)
< 1 − piK−c−11 pi2 implies that φ ≤ 1−pi
K−c−1
1 pi2
1−piK1
.
Setting (1− φ) (1− piK2 ) < 1 − piK−c−11 pi2 implies that 1 − 1−piK−c1−piK ≤ φ. We
can verify that in the appropriate ranges, individuals choose to specialize. The
result follows immediately. The proof for δ2 > δ1 is similar. For the proof when
δ1 = δ2, see Theorem 2.
Finally, Theorem 7 is the generalization of Theorem 3. It states that there is
a parameter region in which individuals choose to specialize, but society would
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prefer to have at least a few generalists.
Theorem 7. If skills are independent and symmetric within discipline, and
there are barriers to working on problems in other disciplines, then there is a
range of values for φ (the fraction of problems assigned to discipline 1) such that
generalists are underprovided in the equilibrium population of problem solvers.
In particular, generalists are underprovided in the following ranges:
If δ1 = δ2, then generalists are underprovided when 1−pi
K−c
1−piK < φ <
1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK
or 1− 1−piN(K−c)
1−piNK < φ < 1− 1−pi
K−c
1−piK
If δ1 > δ2 , then generalists are underprovided when
1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK1
< φ <
1−piN(K−c−1)1 pi2
1−piNK1
or 1− 1−pi
N(K−c−1)
1 pi2
1−piNK2
< φ < 1− 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
If δ2 > δ1 , then generalists are underprovided when
1−pi1piK−c−12
1−piK1
< φ <
1−pi1piN(K−c−1)2
1−piNK1
or 1− 1−pi1pi
N(K−c−1)
2
1−piNK2
< φ < 1− 1−pi1piK−c−12
1−piK2
Proof. First, suppose that δ1 > δ2. The probability that at least one of the N
problem-solvers in the population solves the problem is 1−Prob (none of them do).
If all of the individuals in the population are specialists in discipline 1, then ev-
ery individual has probability φ of a problem occurring in her discipline. In that
case, each specialist in discipline has a probability 1−piK1 of solving the problem
and piK1 of not solving it. With probability 1−φ, the problem is assigned to the
other discipline, and no specialist solves it. Thus, the probability of someone in
a population of specialists solving the problem is
Prob (one of N solve it) = 1− Prob (none of N solve it)
= 1− [φProb (none solve problem in d1) + (1− φ)Prob (none solve problem in d2)]
= 1−
[
φProb (one fails)N + (1− φ) ∗ 1
]
= 1−
[
φ
(
piK1
)N
+ (1− φ) ∗ 1
]
= φ
(
1− piKN1
)
Through a similar argument, if everyone in the population is a specialist
in discipline 2, then the probability that someone in the population solves the
problem is (1− φ) (1− piKN2 ).
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If everyone in the population is a generalists, then the probability of at least
one person in solving the problem is
Prob (one of N solve it) = 1− Prob (none of N solve it)
= 1− (piK−c−11 pi2)N
= 1− piN(K−c−1)1 piN2
Society is better off with a population of generalists than a population of
discipline 1 specialists when 1 − piN(K−c−1)1 piN2 > φ
(
1− piKN1
)
, which is true
when φ < 1−pi
N(K−c−1)
1 pi
N
2
1−piNK1
. However, there is a population of generalists when
φ ≤ 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK1
. It is always the case that 1−pi
K−c−1
1 pi2
1−piK1
≤ 1−pi
N(K−c−1)
1 pi2
1−piNK1
. Thus,
if 1−pi
K−c−1
1 pi2
1−piK1
< φ <
1−piN(K−c−1)1 pi2
1−piNK1
, then society is better off with a population
of generalists, but has a population of specialists.
Through a similar argument, society is better off with a population of gen-
eralists than a population of discipline 2 specialists when 1 − piN(K−c−1)1 piN2 >
(1− φ) (1− piKN2 ), which is true when φ > 1− 1−piN(K−c−1)1 piN21−piNK2 . However, there
is a population of generalists when φ ≤ 1 − 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
. It is always the case
that 1 − 1−pi
N(K−c−1)
1 pi2
1−piNK2
≤ 1 − 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
. Thus, if 1 − 1−pi
N(K−c−1)
1 pi2
1−piNK2
< φ <
1 − 1−piK−c−11 pi2
1−piK2
, then society is better off with a population of generalists, but
has a population of specialists.
The proof for δ2 > δ2 is similar. See the proof of Theorem 3 for the case
where δ1 = δ2.
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